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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS,
Petitioner/Appellant,

:
:

v.

:

M. ELDON BARNES,

i

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 920126

Priority No. 3

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from an order denying a petition for
post-conviction relief in the Third Judicial District Court for
Salt Lake County, the Honorable David S. Young, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the prosecution's failure to notify petitioner
before taking sworn statements of two witnesses violate
petitioner's constitutional rights to due process, to the
assistance of counsel, and to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses?

In reviewing a denial of habeas corpus relief, this

Court will uphold the trial court's factual findings unless
"clearly erroneous," but will review the lower court's legal
conclusions for correctness.

Termunde v. Utah State Prison, 786

P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990).
2.

Was petitioner denied effective assistance of trial

counsel due to the cumulative effect of counsel's allegedly

substandard conduct?

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim

in a habeas proceeding presents a mixed question of law and fact.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2070 (1984).

The factual findings are reviewed for clear error,

and the questions of law are reviewed for correctness.

State v.

Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).
3.

Is petitioner constitutionally entitled to payment

by the State of the costs and attorney's fees incurred in
pursuing his first state habeas petition and the initial appeal
therefrom?

Although petitioner seeks a ruling on this issue as a

matter of constitutional law, the district court found that the
claim presented a legislative question, not a judicial one.
Constitutional and statutory interpretation claims present
questions of law which this Court reviews for correctness.

City

of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert.
denied. 111 S. Ct. 120 (1990); State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786
P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990); Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768
P.2d 455, 457 (Utah 1989) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
All pertinent constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions
are included in the separately-bound addenda submitted herewith.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a plea of guilty entered on September IB, 1987,
petitioner Joseph Mitchell Parsons was convicted of murder in the
first degree, a capital felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-202 (1978); of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in
2

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978); and of theft of an
operable motor vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) (Fifth Dist. Record [hereinafter
M

5th R."] at 79-86, 87; Fifth Dist. Arraignment Transcript at 9).

Sentencing proceedings were conducted January 26 through 29,
1988, in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron
County, State of Utah (5th R. at 146-155).

A sentencing jury

unanimously imposed the death penalty (5th R. at 297-99).
Petitioner, through appointed trial counsel, appealed
to the Utah Supreme Court (5th R. at 403-04).

The Court affirmed

petitioner's convictions and sentence in State v. Parsons, 781
P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989) (a copy of the opinion is submitted
herewith as Addendum A ) . Petitioner filed a petition for
rehearing in the Utah Supreme Court on December 4, 1989 (5th R.
unnumbered, letter dated Dec. 19, 1989).

The Court denied the

petition on January 22, 1990 (5th R. unnumbered, Remittitur dated
Jan. 22, 1990).
Petitioner filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus
relief in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, on March 8, 1990 (Third Dist. R. [hereinafter "3d
R."] at 2-5). The court appointed counsel for petitioner, and
counsel filed an amended petition on October 22, 1990, which
challenged the legality and constitutionality of petitioner's
sentence under the federal and state constitutions based on an
allegation of ineffective assistance of defense counsel at trial
(3d R. at 14, 17-23).

An evidentiary hearing was held on May 24,
3

1991 (3d R. at 214). Thereafter, the court denied the petition
(3d R. at 249-67).

Petitioner appeals from the district court's

ruling, asking this Court to vacate his sentence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Late on August 30, 1987, Richard L. Ernest saw
petitioner hitchhiking near Barstow, California, and stopped to
offer him a ride (Sent. Tr. II at 666, 680-83; Sent. Tr. IV at
1035, 1038-39, 1080-81 ).*

At that time, petitioner was on

parole from a Nevada prison after a conviction of armed robbery
(Sent. Tr. Ill at 900-01, 915-17; Sent. Tr. IV at 1015-17, 1028).
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 31, 1987, Ernest
pulled into a rest area near Cedar City, Utah, and both men
settled in to sleep (Sent. Tr. IV at 1040-41, 1094-97, 1102,
1116).

Petitioner claimed at the penalty hearing that Ernest

made two sexual advances (Sent. Tr. IV at 1041-42, 1099, 110102).

When petitioner attempted to exit the car after the second

advance, Ernest tried to stop him, and, in the ensuing struggle,
petitioner stabbed Ernest several times (Sent. Tr. Ill at 862,
868; Sent. Tr. IV at 1042-44, 1101-03, 1106-08).
Petitioner pushed Ernest's body out of the car a mile
down the road, then drove five miles further to a convenience
store where he cleaned up and assumed Ernest's identity to
purchase food and gas (Sent. Tr. II at 548, 712, 717-19, 722-26;
Sent. Tr. IV at 1045-50, 1111, 1113-16, 1122, 1127).
1

Later that

The penalty phase transcript is comprised of multiple
volumes.
Citations thereto in this brief will be: Sent. Tr.
[vol.] at [page].
4

morning, he again used Ernest's money and credit cards to obtain
lodging and to purchase several items (Sent. Tr. II at 739-42,
748-54, 757-62; Sent. Tr. Ill at 775-77, 780-82; Sent. Tr. IV at
1051-53, 1128-30, 1136-41).
Police officers were alerted to the credit card
purchases and petitioner's unusual activities (Sent. Tr. II at
569-70, 583-84, 597-98).

At 4:15 p.m. on August 31, the police

found petitioner in Ernest's car at a rest area and arrested him
(Sent. Tr. II at 598; Sent. Tr. Ill at 789-91; Sent. Tr. IV at
1055, 1142-43).

At 10:50 a.m. on September 1, the police

discovered Ernest's body (Sent. Tr. II at 548, 588-89).
The court appointed James Shumate to represent
petitioner (5th R. at 69-71).2

A preliminary hearing began on

September 17, 1987, but, at petitioner's request, was not
completed (5th R. at 4-22, 76-77).

On September 18, petitioner

entered a plea of guilty to all three counts (5th R. at 87). He
elected to be sentenced by a jury, and the jury imposed the death
penalty following the penalty hearing (5th R. at 299).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I:

This Court should not consider the merits of

the first issue because petitioner did not timely raise it in his
direct appeal, although he should and could have done so. He
offers no "unusual circumstances" to justify his failure.
Should this Court reach the merits of petitioner's
claim, it should conduct only a federal constitutional analysis.
2

Mr. Shumate is now a Fifth District Court Judge.
5

Petitioner presents no separate state analysis in his brief and
made only nominal reference to the state constitution in the
district court during the habeas proceedings.
Under a federal constitutional analysis, the two
statements are not depositions but are sworn investigative
statements.

They were part of the State's early pre-trial

investigation and were used only by petitioner at trial.

There

is no evidence that the State attempted to "create" testimony by
taking the statements under oath, and petitioner's claim that the
statements prejudicially "locked in" testimony is purely
speculative.

He establishes no denial of a constitutional right.

Finally, petitioner has abandoned his claim that his
trial counsel's failure to attack the statements constitutes
ineffective assistance where he does not present the argument to
this Court, and he withdrew the argument at the district court
level to pursue the issue as a substantive error.
Point II: All of the alleged deficiencies in the
conduct of petitioner's trial counsel constitute reasonable trial
strategy or otherwise fall within the wide range of
professionally competent assistance.

Further, petitioner fails

to establish the requisite prejudice for any of his claims. As
none of the claimed errors are either substantial or prejudicial,
the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.
Point III: The federal constitution does not require
the state to provide counsel to indigent inmates at state expense
for pursuit of postconviction review.
6

Petitioner provides no

valid basis for his suggested expansion of state constitutional
rights beyond those recognized at the federal level.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER'S SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGE TO THE
SWORN STATEMENTS IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED, AS
IT SHOULD AND COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON
DIRECT APPEAL; ALTERNATIVELY, THE DISTRICT
COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE STATEMENTS
WERE MERELY INVESTIGATIVE, AND PETITIONER'S
SPECULATIVE ARGUMENTS DO NOT ESTABLISH ANY
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
A.

Procedural Bar

Petitioner claims that the prosecution's failure to
provide him with notice of and an opportunity to appear at the
taking of the two sworn statements denied him his due process
rights, his right to counsel, and his right to confront witnesses
under the federal and state constitutions (Br. of App. at 11-12).
His failure to raise this issue in his direct appeal and his
untimely presentation of this issue in his habeas proceedings
procedurally bar review of the merits.
Generally, habeas corpus proceedings are used to attack
a conviction when an obvious injustice or a substantial denial of
a constitutional right occurred at trial.

Gerrish v. Barnes, No.

900352, slip op. at 8 (Utah Dec. 16, 1992); Fernandez v. Cook,
783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989); Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 804
(Utah 1988).

A petitioner cannot raise issues in his habeas

petition that could or should have been raised on direct appeal
absent unusual circumstances justifying the failure to raise the
issues earlier.

Gerrish, slip op. at 8; Jensen v. DeLand, 795
7

P.2d 619, 620 (Utah 1989); Fernandez, 783 P.2d at 549; see Bundy,
763 P.2d at 804; Wells v. Shulsen. 747 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah
1987) (per curiam); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah
1983).

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel come within

this "unusual circumstances" exception when the same counsel
represented the petitioner at trial and on direct appeal.3
Fernandez, 783 P.2d at 549; see Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029,
1035-36 & n.6 (Utah 1989) (collecting cases on "unusual
circumstances" and indicating that such circumstances exist where
a petitioner is unjustifiably denied an opportunity to raise an
issue on direct appeal).

In this case, petitioner's claim of a

substantive constitutional violation is asserted independent of
his ineffectiveness argument; therefore petitioner must establish
unusual circumstances justifying his failure to raise the
substantive violation on direct appeal.
Petitioner relies on his trial memorandum from the
habeas proceedings as adequately raising the issue (Br. of App.
at 12), and makes no reference to or justification for his
failure to include the point in his direct appeal.

His habeas

petition was based on several alleged instances of ineffective
assistance which encompassed the sworn statements (3d R. at 1723; copy submitted herewith as Addendum B).

3

It was not until the

The fact that trial counsel also represented a defendant on
direct appeal constitutes an unusual circumstance only in the
context of a claim of ineffective assistance because counsel cannot
be expected to raise his own ineffectiveness. Fernandez, 783 P.2d
at 549-50. This concern does not apply in areas of substantive
error. See id., 783 P.2d at 550.

8

day before the evidentiary hearing that petitioner filed the
trial memorandum which, for the first time, asserted that the
taking of the statements constituted a substantive due process
violation warranting reversal of his conviction (3d R. at 188213; copy submitted herewith as Addendum C).

When asked to

procedurally bar the issue, the district court refused, saying
that "when the focus of the petitioner's claim[, as] stated
herein, is on the effectiveness of counsel, and since that same
counsel handled both the trial and appeal, it seems appropriate
and equitable that this Court consider those arguments on their
merits." (3d R. at 256; copy submitted herewith as Addendum D).
The court then addressed the issue in the manner in which it was
first presented:

part of the claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel (3d R. at 253-55, 257-65; Addendum D ) .
The district court erred in refusing to procedurally
bar this issue.

See Pierre v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1282, 1283 (10th

Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1033 (1987).

This Court must

correct that error to achieve consistent application of Utah's
procedural bar rules. Where state courts fail to consistently
apply the state procedural bar rules, federal courts are not
bound by those rules in federal postconviction review and may
reach the merits of issues otherwise not properly before them.
Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-61, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1043
(1989) (generally, federal courts are not prevented from reaching
the merits of a claim on habeas unless the last state court
rendering a judgment "clearly and expressly" states that its
9

decision rests on a state procedural bar); Andrews v. Deland, 943
F.2d 1162, 1188-92 (1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1213 (1992);
Church v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1501, 1506-08 (10th Cir. 1991).
Because the substantive issue petitioner now seeks to
have reviewed was not raised in his direct appeal, despite its
availability, and petitioner advances no justification for his
failure to timely raise the issue, there are no "unusual
circumstances" and the issue should be procedurally barred.
B.
1.

Merits

State Constitutional Review
Petitioner asserts that this Court should find a per se

violation of his rights under both the state and federal
constitutions (Br. of App. at 17). However, he made only nominal
reference to the state constitution in his trial memorandum to
the district court during his habeas review (see Addendum C ) , and
he has provided no separate analysis in his brief to this Court
based on state constitutional provisions.

Consequently, a

separate state constitutional analysis is not warranted.

State

v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 & n.5 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus
granted on other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10 Cir. 1991).
2.

Federal Constitutional Review
Petitioner characterizes the two sworn statements he

now challenges as "depositions" and contends that the taking of
depositions without notice to or the presence of petitioner or
his counsel constitutes a per se violation of his due process

10

right, his right to counsel, and his right to confront and crossexamine witnesses against him.
The district court found that "these 'depositions' were
nothing more than investigative sworn statements, and in fact
worked to the benefit of the petitioner during the course of the
penalty phase of the trial. . . . The statements were from the
beginning readily available to defense counsel, and were only
generated in order to preserve investigative information." (3d R.
at 260-61; 276-77; Addendum D).

The court thus concluded "that

the statements were not 'depositions', but were rather 'sworn
statements' generated by a careful and thoughtful investigative
prosecutor." (3d R. at 261; Addendum D).
the latter finding.

Petitioner challenges

This Court will uphold the trial court's

factual findings unless it finds them to be "clearly erroneous."
Termunde v. Utah State Prison, 786 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990).
A.

Characterization of Statements
As petitioner recognizes, the timing and nature of the

statements are important.

This case, characterized by the

prosecutor as a major case (Evidentiary Hearing Transcript
[hereinafter "H.C. Tr."] at 352), involved a murder occurring in
the early morning hours of August 31, 1987. Petitioner was
apprehended later the same day (Sent. Tr. Ill at 789-91).

The

victim's body was found a day later on September 1 (Sent. Tr. II
at 548, 588-89; H.C. Tr. at 352). The information was originally
filed on September 2, 1987, two days after the murder (5th R. at
72).

On the same day, the State took the two sworn statements
11

now challenged by petitioner (H.C. Tr. at 69; see statements of
Chad Williams and Beverly Ernest on file with this Court)-

One

statement was from the victim's widow, a California resident who
was emotionally distraught, having lost her estranged husband to
a brutal murder only two days earlier (H.C. Tr. at 60-61; Ernest
Statement).

The second statement came from a witness whose

testimony and identification of petitioner was a key part of the
prosecution's case and who was in fear of his life (H.C. Tr. at
60, 67-68; Williams Statement).
The reasonableness of questioning an identification
witness and the widow of the murder victim during the initial
stages of an investigation is clear.

Defendant suggests that the

prosecutor's precaution of taking the statements under oath
changed the interviews into depositions, which he has a right to
attend.

He cites no authority providing that the State cannot

conduct its investigatory interviews under oath or that, if it
does so, defendant must be present (see discussion of rule 14,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, infra).

Scott Burns, the Iron

County Prosecuting Attorney, arranged to take the statements
under oath in order to prepare and investigate his case (H.C. Tr.
at 62, 71). The State neither used nor intended to use the
statements at trial (H.C. Tr. at 65-66, 70). When the statements
were made, the prosecutor did not know what petitioner's claims
or defenses were (H.C. Tr. at 57-58), and he did not fully
understand the events surrounding the murder (H.C. Tr. at 62-63),
as evidenced by his filing of an amended information on September
12

10 (5th R. at 1-3). The State took at least four other
unchallenged statements on or about September 2, seeking to "put
everything in perspective" early in the case, including the
timing and sequence of events (H.C. Tr. at 62-63).

As the

district court recognized, the case for both parties was at the
investigatory stage.

Petitioner took advantage of the State's

investigation by using one statement during the penalty phase to
attempt to impeach the victim's widow (Sent. Tr. Ill at 888-92).
There is no evidence supporting petitioner's claim that
the prosecution deliberately attempted to "create" testimony (Br.
of App. at 13). There is no evidence that any of the information
in the statements was false or that either individual would have
testified differently at the penalty phase if they had not given
their statements to the prosecutor under oath.

The prosecution

voluntarily opened its file to defense counsel, and the taking of
the statements under oath memorialized the investigation and
enabled the State to provide petitioner with a copy of the exact
information its investigation uncovered.

Use of both an oath and

a reporter was merely a precaution occasionally used by the
prosecutor and generated by the nature of the crime.
The prosecutor's motives for conducting interviews
under oath, and the timing and nature of the interviews, support
the trial court's finding that the statements were investigative
sworn statements.
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B.

Constitutional Violations
As petitioner recognized, the district court did not

address this issue on constitutional grounds.

The court's

failure is without consequence, however, as the issue is
procedurally barred (see subsection A, supra).

However, even if

the court had addressed the constitutional grounds, it would have
found no merit to counsel's argument.
Petitioner initially asserts that the taking of the
statements violated rule 14(h), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and that the violation has constitutional significance (Br. of
App. at 13-14).

Rule 14(h) outlines the method by which either

party in a criminal proceeding may preserve the testimony of any
material witness whom the party has reason to believe will be
unable to attend a trial or hearing; the party would apply to the
court for an order permitting examination of the witness by
deposition, giving notice to the opposing party (a copy of the
rule is submitted herewith as Addendum E). Scott Burns, the
prosecuting attorney, testified that his reasons for taking the
statements in question were not those involved in rule 14(h)
(H.C. Tr. at 69-70).

Although he was concerned with the

anxieties harbored by each individual (H.C. Tr. at 60-61), the
record does not indicate that he had any belief or reason to
believe that either would be unable to appear in court if
necessary.
phase.

In fact, both individuals testified at the penalty

Burns acknowledged not only that he did not intend to use

the statements at trial, but that he knew he would likely not be
14

allowed to do so (H.C. Tr. at 70). He intended to gain and
preserve the information for his own investigative use (H.C. Tr.
at 62, 71). As the threshold for invoking rule 14(h) did not
exist, any failure to proceed under the rule has no bearing here.
Petitioner further argues that the prosecution's taking
of sworn statements without his presence violated his right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses.

The primary object of

the right of confrontation is to prevent depositions and ex parte
affidavits from being used against the accused at trial in lieu
of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness
against him.

State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 785 (Utah 1980).

That object was not violated here as the prosecution did not use
the sworn statements in court, and petitioner took full advantage
of his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses, both of
whom testified at the penalty phase. As noted above, the
statements were sworn interviews of potential witnesses taken
during an investigation two days after a murder.

As they were

not depositions, petitioner had no constitutional right to be
present.

Petitioner's comparison of these early, investigatory

statements with the right to cross-examine witnesses at a
preliminary hearing and the right to have counsel present during
a pre-trial line-up is not helpful.

The statements did not

prevent petitioner from presenting evidence to the court, but
provided him with potential impeachment material.
Petitioner contends that the taking of sworn statements
from key witnesses concerning key issues "permanently tainted"
15

the witnesses by freezing their testimony without benefit of
cross-examination (Br. of App. at 17). This argument is purely
speculative.

Petitioner offers no proof that the witnesses'

testimony was false or in any other manner "tainted."
Petitioner's contention that the prosecution's mention
of perjury to the victim's widow "locked in" her testimony is
also speculative (Br. of App. at 16). Petitioner has not
demonstrated that the testimony would have changed absent the
prosecutor's reference to perjury or that the perjury reference
resulted in testimony more favorable to the prosecution than
might otherwise have been given.

Oaths are administered to give

a greater assurance of veracity, and a witness has a right to
know the legal ramifications arising from testifying under oath.
The district court affirmatively found that "the taking of the
sworn statements [did not] in any way affect[] the testimony of
the witnesses. . . . Had the witness been more closely crossexamined by vigorous defense counsel there would have been no
change."

(3d R. at 261; Addendum D).

Petitioner's speculative

assertions do not establish a denial of his constitutional rights
and are without merit.
Finally, petitioner affirmatively used one sworn
statements during the penalty phase, attempting to impeach the
victim's widow (Sent. Tr. Ill at 888-92).

He does not cite this

as part of his counsel's ineffectiveness.

Petitioner cannot use

the statements, then complain that their existence constitutes
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prejudicial error*

See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285

(Utah 1989); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987).
C.

Abandonment of Ineffective Assistance Claim

Petitioner presents this issue as a substantive due
process violation only.

When he first raised this issue

substantively in the district court, he ceased to assert that the
statements related to his trial counsel's allegedly ineffective
representation (3d R. at 188-213; Addendum C). Although the
district court addressed the issue under the ineffective
assistance argument, petitioner does not challenge that ruling
insofar as it relates to his counsel's performance.

Accordingly,

he has abandoned the claim as a basis for his ineffectiveness
argument.

See Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346,

1348 (Utah 1983) (failure to include argument in brief on appeal
constitutes abandonment of claim); Salt Lake City v. Towne House
Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 420, 424 P.2d 442, 445 (1967);
Linford v. Linford, 116 Utah 21, 26, 207 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1949);
see also State v. Mova, 815 P.2d 1312, 1315 n.6 (Utah App. 1991).
POINT II
PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE
RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT
THE PENALTY PHASE
A.

Introduction

Petitioner contends that his counsel at the sentencing
proceedings rendered ineffective assistance, in violation of
petitioner's sixth amendment right (Br. of App. at 18-42).

He

cites eight areas of conduct, one of which he claims individually
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warrants reversal of his sentence, and all of which he claims
cumulatively warrant reversal.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, petitioner must first show specific deficiencies which
"fall outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance[,]" and second, establish a reasonable probability
that but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the
trial would have been different.

State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401,

405 (Utah 1986); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
690, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066, 2071 (1984); State v. Carter,
776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 11819 n.2 (Utah 1989).

When petitioner challenges a death sentence,

the focus of the second prong of the test becomes "whether there
is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. Proof of deficient performance must
not be speculative but a demonstrable reality.

State v. Jones,

177 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (Utah Dec. 31, 1991); Codianna v. Morris,
660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983).

A legitimate choice of trial

strategy which fails to produce anticipated results does not
constitute ineffective assistance, Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109,
and petitioner has the burden of showing that counsel's actions
were not conscious trial strategy.

State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d

155, 160 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1024 (1990); State
v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987).
18

The court need not

determine whether petitioner has met the first prong of the test
before examining the second prong

fl

'[i]£ it is easier to dispose

of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice[.]'"

Frame, 723 P.2d at 405 (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697). This standard is applicable to claims of
ineffective assistance claims in habeas proceedings.

See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (federal habeas); Bundv v. Deland,
763 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1988) (state habeas); Codianna, 660
P.2d at 1108-14 (state habeas).
Although petitioner recognizes this two-part test, he
urges this Court to abandon or limit application of the second
(prejudice) prong and to focus on the first (substandard
performance) prong (Br. of App. at 18-20).

He argues that once

he shows that counsel rendered deficient performance, he is
entitled to reversal of his sentence whether or not counsel's
conduct rendered the result of the sentencing proceedings
unreliable.

His suggestion that the mere existence of a

deficiency is sufficient to warrant setting aside the sentencing
outcome is without merit and was specifically rejected by the
United States Supreme Court in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-94.
The suggestion provides no workable principle as it requires the
assumption of prejudice in areas where it is equally likely that
no prejudice occurred.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.

The purpose of the constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel is to ensure a fair trial.

Id.., 466 U.S.

at 696-97; State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).
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To

that end, the overriding concern in reviewing a claim of
ineffectiveness is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial or
sentencing cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87; Templin, 805 P.2d at 186; Frame,
723 P.2d at 405.

In requiring proof of both deficient conduct

and prejudice, the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland explained:
An error by counsel, even if professionally
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the
judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no
effect on the judgment, [citations omitted]. The
purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is
to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary
to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.
Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's performance
must be prejudicial to the defense in order to
constitute ineffective assistance under the
Constitution.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92.

Given the fluid nature of the

legal profession and the infinite variety and unpredictable
nature of possible errors in counsel's conduct, a petitioner who
establishes that certain errors by counsel were unreasonable must
also show that the errors actually had an adverse effect on the
defense.

.Id.., 466 U.S. at 693; see also Verde, 770 P.2d at 118-

19; Frame, 723 P.2d at 405; State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645 (Utah
1985).

Both prongs apply equally to capital and non-capital

cases.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87; State v. Gardner, 789

P.2d 273, 288 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990).
Petitioner contends that, "by the nature of the issue
presented[,]" the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Templin, 805
P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), adopted the position that the second prong
20

of the test need not always be applied (Br. of App. at 20). To
the contrary, in Tempiin, this Court specifically relied on both
parts of the Strickland test in finding that Templin was denied
his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
Templin involved a failure to reasonably investigate the
availability of prospective defense witnesses.

This Court

specifically reiterated its position that "[d]efendant has the
burden of meeting both parts of [the Strickland! test," and found
that both parts of the test had been met.
186.

Templin, 805 P.2d at

After first finding that counsel's performance was

deficient, this Court reviewed the testimony that would have been
given by the prospective witnesses and the totality of the
evidence adduced at trial,

id., 805 P.2d at 188.

It found that

the record did not strongly support the conviction, the expected
testimony would have directly affected the credibility of the one
person on whom the State's case rested, and the testimony would
not have been cumulative.

JEd. As the testimony affected the

"entire evidentiary picture," it was of sufficient import to
establish a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different had the witnesses testified at trial.

Id.

Petitioner must meet both prongs of the Strickland test
to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

His

failure to demonstrate in any of his claims either that his trial
counsel's performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by
that performance will be addressed individually hereafter.
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B.

Inadequate Pre-trial Investigation

Petitioner contends that his trial counsel's
performance was deficient because counsel undertook substandard
pretrial investigation into the victim's alleged homosexual
tendencies and failed to seek an autopsy of the victim to look
for physical signs of homosexual activity (Br. of App. at 21).
Petitioner argues that this conduct alone warrants reversal of
his death sentence without the need to inquire into the existence
of prejudice (Jd. at 2 2 ) /
Petitioner's failure to establish the requisite
prejudice defeats his claim of ineffective assistance.5
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1110.

Petitioner also fails to make the

showing required under the first prong of the test.

Although he

identifies counsel's allegedly substandard performance,
petitioner does not show how the performance was deficient.
The United States Supreme Court in Strickland spoke
directly to the issue of the adequacy of pretrial investigation:
[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation
of law and facts relevant to plausible options are
virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made
after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation. In
A

Although petitioner opines that some of the claims of
deficient conduct by themselves justify reversal of his sentence,
he identifies only this issue as being individually sufficient.
5

Contrary to petitioner's assertion that some issues do not
lend themselves to proof of prejudice under the second prong of the
test, prejudice has been required and ineffectiveness found where
defendants have alleged insufficient investigation by counsel.
Templin, 805 P.2d at 187-89; State v. Crestani, 771 >.2d 1085,
1091-92 (Utah App. 1989).
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other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to
investigate must be directly assessed for
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments,
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.

See generally Templin, 805 P.2d

at 188 (a decision to cease investigation may be a tactical
decision following adequate initial inquiry).

In this case, the

record illustrates that counsel's investigation was adequate to
support his decision not to investigate the matter further.
Petitioner's expert at the evidentiary hearing
indicated that a failure to conduct any investigation would be
substandard (H.C. Tr. at 81). Judge James Shumate, petitioner's
trial counsel, testified at the evidentiary hearing that he, in
fact, investigated the victim's sexual orientation.

Counsel

recognized that the victim's sexual preference was important as
potential substantiation for the defense petitioner asserted and
as a potentially mitigating circumstance (H.C. Tr. at 16-17, 31).
He indicated that M[he] was concerned from the outset[,] because
of [petitioner's] relation to [counsel] of the events surrounding
the homicide, as to whether or not there might be any indication
that the decedent was, in fact, prone to homosexual tendencies,
had any homosexual background, or orientation whatsoever."
Tr. at 16-17).

(H.C.

Judge Shumate spoke with the victim's family

members, the victim's widow, the victim's stepfather, and Bruce
Opp, a friend of the victim for two years (Sent. Tr. II at 679,
692; H.C. Tr. at 15-18, 21-22).

Although the exact content of
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counsel's investigation was not revealed, the record provides a
clear picture of counsel's findings.

The victim's widow, who had

been married to the victim for ten years, emphatically testified
at the penalty hearing that the victim did not have homosexual
tendencies (Sent, Tr. Ill at 883; Sent. Tr. IV at 1187-89), that
he dated other women (Sent. Tr. IV at 1189), and that he had an
affair with another woman (Ici. ) . Her sworn statement, provided
to Judge Shumate by the prosecution the same month it was taken
(H.C. Tr. at 44), indicated that the victim had a girlfriend at
the time she first met him (Ernest Statement at 4), and that he
had "a very good friend" whom he had kissed and "cared for very
much[.]" (Ernest Statement at 32). Opp testified that
homosexuality "was the farthest thing from [the victim's] mind"
and that the victim dated other women once he became estranged
from his wife (Sent. Tr. IV at 1177).

Even the prosecution's

investigation failed to reveal evidence of any homosexual
tendencies (H.C. Tr. at 56-59).
Counsel conducted adequate investigation into the issue
to permit a reasoned determination concerning further
investigation.

His decision not to proceed further in the face

of the information obtained from the victim's family and friends
is a reasonable tactical decision which does not amount to
deficient performance.

See, e.g., Strickland, 446 U.S. at 690-

91; Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1110.
Petitioner merely assumes that actual evidence of
homosexual tendencies might have been found which may have
24

resulted in a different sentencing outcome.
that the contrary is more likely.

The record indicates

In addition to the information

outlined above, the record contains testimony from the victim's
father-in-law and uncle-in-law who testified at the penalty phase
that the victim had no homosexual tendencies (Sent. Tr. IV at
1176-77, 1180-81, 1184-85).

The victim stayed with Bruce Opp one

night following his separation from his wife, but he slept in his
van outside Opp's home (Sent. Tr. Ill at 830).6

The evidence

belies the likelihood that any evidence of the victim's alleged
homosexuality would have been found.

Further investigation

likely would not have resulted in a different outcome in the
sentencing proceedings.

Absent evidence that counsel's failure

to investigate further prejudiced petitioner, that failure cannot
establish ineffective assistance.
C.

Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1110.

Deficient Guilty Plea Advice

Petitioner next argues that he received ineffective
representation because his counsel advised him to plead guilty as
charged to capital homicide, aggravated robbery, and theft.

He

argues that the advice to plead guilty was not a legitimate trial
strategy but was deficient because his counsel mistakenly led him
to believe that the plea was in his best interests when in fact
he received no "benefit" from the bargain (Br. of App. at 24-25).

6

In contrast, the Iron County Attorney testified at the
evidentiary hearing that his investigation indicated that
petitioner was known to have had a homosexual partner while
incarcerated in a Nevada prison and had demonstrated homosexual
tendencies while in the Iron County Jail (H.C. Tr. at 58, 72).
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This challenge to petitioner's guilty plea necessarily
fails because he does not make the required allegation that there
is a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial absent counsel's
advice.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370

(1985) (when a claim of ineffective counsel involves a guilty
plea, the prejudice requirement focuses on whether counsel's
actions affected the outcome of the plea process).

Even if the

allegation had been made, petitioner's repeated assertions of
guilt, both before and after entering his plea, and his adamant
desire to end the preliminary hearing make it unlikely that he
would have insisted on going to trial.
The claim also fails because counsel's advice
constituted a legitimate trial strategy, and petitioner has
failed to prove otherwise.

The fact that it did not have the

anticipated result does not render counsel's representation
deficient.

Bullock, 791 P.2d at 160. Judge Shumate testified in

detail at the evidentiary hearing regarding the purpose behind
entering the plea:

to blunt the thrust of the evidence to be

presented to the penalty phase jury in hopes of finding the jury
more amenable to a sentence other than death (H.C. Tr. at 29-30).
Petitioner admitted at both the preliminary and the evidentiary
hearings that he killed the victim (H.C. Tr. at 43-44, 51, 63).
Judge Shumate determined that a guilt phase would allow the State
the opportunity to emphasize and re-emphasize the crimes in
detail to the jury (H.C. Tr. at 29-30).
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He also recognized the

possibility that once the jury had seen the evidence throughout
the guilt phase, the emotional momentiom likely to be generated by
the details of the homicide would be against petitioner and could
render the jury more likely to impose a death sentence during the
penalty phase (H.C. Tr. at 30). He discussed this strategy and
the possibility of entering a guilty plea with petitioner at
length, providing petitioner with the opportunity to fully
consider the move (H.C. Tr. at 27-30, 47-48).

Petitioner

admitted that before he entered his plea, he knew the evidence
the State possessed (H.C. Tr. at 45-46), he knew that he would
still face the penalty phase (5th R. at 81-82; H.C. Tr. at 5152), and he knew the State had a good chance of getting the death
penalty (H.C. Tr. at 47). Despite his self-serving claim that
Judge Shumate told him that there was only Ma possibility of
getting the death penalty[,]" (id..), petitioner knew that he
could still receive a death sentence (H.C. Tr. at 47, 51-52, 54),
and that his counsel's opinion was not binding (5th R. at 82-83).
Judge Shumate's judgment, analysis and determination were made in
light of his extensive prior trial experience, including more
than eleven years as a defense attorney handling more than 150
jury trials, and experience as associate counsel on one prior
capital case and as lead counsel on two prior capital cases (H.C.
Tr. at 8-11, 35-36).

Under the circumstances of this case, this

strategy clearly meets an objective standard of reasonableness,
and counsel's advice pursuant to this strategy lies within the
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wide range of professionally competent assistance.

Frame, 723

P.2d at 405.
Petitioner's contention that the lack of any
"meaningful benefit" from the plea bargain renders counsel's
representation deficient has no basis in the record.

Plea

bargaining is both tolerated and encouraged by our legal system.
Bordenkircher v. Haves, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65, 98 S. Ct. 663, 66768 (1978).

The "mutuality of advantage" upon which plea

bargaining is based was satisfied in this case.

See id., 434

U.S. at 363; State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988).

Both

petitioner and Judge Shumate testified at the evidentiary hearing
that the plea was primarily based on petitioner's strong desire
to waive his preliminary hearing (H.C. Tr. at 26-27, 44-46,
63). 7

Article 1, section 13 of the Utah Constitution and rule

7(7)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, permit a petitioner to
waive his preliminary hearing with the prosecution's consent.
The prosecution withheld its consent in this case for three
legitimate reasons:

1) to preserve testimony created at the

preliminary hearing; 2) to avoid the possibility that a future
defect in the trial would be claimed because of the waiver; and
3) to avoid the possibility that a potential change of counsel
between the preliminary hearing and the trial might result in a
defect because necessary evidence was not established in the
record (H.C. Tr. at 63-64, 100-01).

7

The bargain ultimately

The plea bargain is addressed further in subsection F,

infra.
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struck by the parties required that the State relinquish its
concerns and permit waiver of the preliminary hearing in exchange
for a guilty plea.
benefits:

In return, petitioner gained several

1) the ability to employ the strategy outlined above;

2) the cessation of the preliminary hearing proceedings as
adamantly desired by petitioner; 3) the return of certain items
of clothing; and 4) the return of money petitioner possessed when
arrested (5th R. at 79-86; H.C. Tr. at 47-48).

Additionally,

petitioner agreed to plead guilty to only one of the numerous
aggravating circumstances alleged in the information: a previous
conviction for a violent felony (H.C. Tr. at 24-25).

As this

Court recognized in the direct appeal, "[i]t is clear from the
record that great care was taken to ascertain the voluntariness
of his plea."

State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1280 (Utah 1989).

The benefits petitioner received were clearly
meaningful to him, despite his assertions to the contrary.
Petitioner actively sought to waive the preliminary hearing
before it began (H.C. Tr. at 27, 45). When Judge Shumate's
attempts to secure the prosecution's consent failed, the hearing
commenced.

Judge Shumate testified that once the preliminary

hearing started, petitioner "was extremely agitated and upset . .
. [and] had no desire whatsoever to go through [with it]." (H.C.
Tr. at 27). Shumate explained that not only did petitioner want
the proceedings stopped, but he "became extremely adamant,
basically said, I don't want this to go farther any more" and
authorized counsel to "just do whatever it takes to get this
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thing stopped."

(id.).

Scott Burns indicated that petitioner

made similar statements in open court at the preliminary hearing
(H.C. Tr. at 63). Petitioner readily admitted his repeated
attempts to waive the preliminary hearing (H.C. Tr. at 44-46).
Further, petitioner thought the clothing and money sufficiently
important below to actively pursue them before any plea agreement
was struck (5th R. at 54-55), and to push the prosecution to
return them to him when the State's performance was delayed (5th
R. at 96-97, 107-08).
Entering a guilty plea was a valid legal strategy, and
defendant received the benefit he bargained for.

He has not

shown that absent counsel's advice he would have insisted on
going to trial. Accordingly, counsel's recommendation to enter
the guilty plea was not ineffective representation.
D.

Inadequate Juror/Witness Contact Investigation
Petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective

because, after a witness and a juror had contact at the penalty
phase, counsel did not actively examine the witness, did not ask
the juror if he had been influenced by the contact, and
specifically waived the issue for appellate review by commenting
that he saw no prejudice from the contact (Br. of App. at 26-27).
Petitioner relies heavily on the "strict approach" to
juror/witness contact taken by this Court in State v. Pike, 712
P.2d 277, 279-81 (Utah 1985).

However, when faced with

petitioner's substantive challenge to the contact on direct
appeal, this Court held that "[e]ven analyzing the facts under
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the standards provided in fPikel, . . . we could find no error."
Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1285 (citation omitted).

Where there was no

substantive error arising from the contact, counsel's waiver of
the "error" and his failure to more vigorously interrogate the
witness and the juror cannot constitute ineffective assistance.
See Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109; State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56,
58 (Utah 1982) (a failure to act when the act would have proven
futile will not establish ineffective assistance).
E. Failure to File a Formal Discovery Motion
Petitioner next complains that his counsel was
ineffective because he did not file a formal discovery request
and that his sentence should be vacated solely because of
counsel's allegedly improper conduct.

He expressly fails to

establish any prejudice from the lack of a formal discovery
motion, claiming that, under State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah
1985), he has "lost forever the right to discover and apply
information that may exist."

(Br. of App. at 30). In Booker,

defense counsel did not make the discovery request required under
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16 (1982), either written or oral, at any
time.

Booker, 709 P.2d at 346. He was therefore unable to

assert error in the prosecution's failure to provide him with a
police report prior to trial. .Id. Booker is inapposite to this
case, as petitioner here presents a constitutional argument and
does not contest the evidence that the prosecution had an open
file policy and provided all information to defense counsel as it
was received.

Petitioner does not claim that undiscovered
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information existed during trial or was found subsequent to trial
which affects this case.

Speculation that exculpatory evidence

may be found in the future which may be adversely affected by the
lack of a formal discovery motion will not support a finding of
ineffective assistance.

State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1068

(Utah 1988) (mere speculation is insufficient); Bundv, 763 P.2d
at 806.

Because there does not appear to be any possibility of

prejudice to petitioner due to the lack of a formal motion,
petitioner's claim must be denied.

See State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d

1207, 1210 (Utah App. 1991).
Although petitioner's failure to meet the second
(prejudice) prong of the ineffectiveness test defeats this claim,
he also fails to meet the first prong.

Petitioner cites no

authority holding that the failure to file written discovery
requests constitutes per se ineffective assistance of counsel.
See, e.g., State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah App. 1992)
(failure to file formal discovery motion is not per se
ineffective assistance).

As long as counsel adequately

investigated the case through methods other than by formal
discovery, his failure to file a written motion would not
constitute deficient performance.

See id., 840 P.2d at 791-92.

In this case, counsel adequately investigated the case, in part
through an informal discovery arrangement with the prosecution
whereby both parties had access to any information in the police
or county attorney's files (H.C. Tr. at 22-24, 35, 59). The
prosecutor voluntarily provided defense counsel with copies of
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various documents, acquiring an on-going duty to disclose any
material which he may discover.
916-17 (Utah 1987).
petitioner.

State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913,

No breach of that duty has been alleged by

Further, the prosecutor testified that everything he

used or discovered was given to defense counsel (H.C. Tr. at 59),
and defense counsel testified that everything used by the State
at trial had been made available to him previously (H.C. Tr. at
35).

Petitioner has not shown that the failure to formalize the

discovery arrangement in this case prevented his counsel from
obtaining any information not already made available to him.
Where counsel discovered all relevant information, his failure to
file a formal discovery motion cannot constitute ineffective
assistance.

See Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109, 1113 (failure to

file motions or object when such conduct would add nothing to the
proceedings does not establish ineffective assistance).
F.

Failure to Prevent Entry of Plea

Petitioner avers that the prosecutor unconstitutionally
coerced his guilty plea, and that trial counsel was ineffective
in not preventing petitioner from entering the plea, not
challenging at the preliminary hearing the constitutionality of
the prosecutor's refusal to consent to waiver of the preliminary
hearing, and not attacking the guilty plea on appeal based on
duress by the prosecution (Br. of App. at 32-33).

He does not

claim any prejudice from this allegedly deficient conduct.
Petitioner essentially argues that Judge Shumate should
have fought to obtain the waiver of the preliminary hearing
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without entering the plea bargain.

However, the entry of the

plea not only was a means by which to waive the hearing, but, as
previously established, was a tactical decision made in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment (see subsection C,
supra).

Because the prosecution would consider no other plea

arrangement (H.C. Tr. at 29, 45, 63-64), a refusal to enter the
plea would have resulted in continuation of the preliminary
hearing, and the defensive strategy behind the plea would have
been lost to petitioner.

The existence of other options

considered more reasonable by appellate counsel does not render
trial counsel's conduct ineffective.

Bullock, 791 P.2d at 160;

Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023-24. This Court will not second-guess
the strategic decisions of trial counsel.

Bullock, 791 P.2d at

160; Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1110. As petitioner has not
established that counsel's failure to pursue waiver of the
preliminary hearing in lieu of entering a plea was not a
reasonable strategic decision or that petitioner was prejudiced
by counsel's failure to so act, petitioner's ineffectiveness
claim should be denied.
Petitioner also challenges trial counsel's failure to
attack the guilty plea on appeal based on the prosecution's
alleged exercise of duress in obtaining the plea.

However, he

fails to establish how such conduct is deficient.

The State's

consent to waiver of the preliminary hearing is required by rule
and by state constitution.

Utah R. Crim. P. 7(7)(a); Utah Const,

art. I, § 13. Petitioner cites no authority for his suggestion
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that the prosecutor's use in the plea bargaining process of his
consent to the preliminary hearing waiver is reversible error.
Withholding consent does not rise to the level of duress merely
because petitioner is adamant about his desire to waive the
preliminary hearing.

Any duress which may have existed did not

make the plea any less a tactical decision or a reasonable
exercise of trial counsel's judgment. A challenge to the plea on
direct appeal would have suggested invited error, which is looked
on with disfavor by appellate courts.

Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1280;

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987).

In this

case, counsel's failure to challenge the plea on appeal is within
an objective standard of reasonableness and, hence, is not
deficient performance.
G.

Inadequate Trial Preparation

Petitioner contends that his trial counsel spent an
inadequate amount of time with him outside of the courtroom and
that this conduct is sufficiently deficient to warrant reversal
of his death sentence.

Instead of establishing how the amount of

time spent together constituted deficient performance, petitioner
urges this Court to hold that it is per se ineffective for
counsel in a capital case to meet with his client outside the
courtroom for a total of between four and twenty hours (Br. of
App. at 33-34).

Once again petitioner fails to show how this

allegedly deficient conduct resulted in prejudice.
This Court has not established the arbitrary time limit
petitioner seeks to create in order to measure defense counsel's
35

performance, and petitioner provides no legal authority to do so
here.

Instead, by noting the disparate estimates given by

himself and Judge Shumate regarding time spent together on the
case and arguing that Shumate was not credible, petitioner seeks
a re-evaluation of the district court's credibility
determination.

He fails to show that additional time spent with

his trial counsel would have yielded any information not already
available to counsel at trial.
The time counsel actually spent with petitioner was a
fraction of the time he spent on the case as a whole.

Judge

Shumate testified that he spent eight to ten hours on the case
prior to the preliminary hearing, 400 to 500 hours total working
on the case, and 100 hours taking the direct appeal (H.C. Tr. at
28-29, 34-35, 37-39).

He outlined the type of work he undertook,

including the use of extensive discovery.

In addition to the

evidence he ultimately adduced at the penalty phase, counsel
discovered what evidence the State would later present to the
sentencing jury.

Absent a suggestion of what relevant additional

information would have been revealed had counsel spent more time
with petitioner, counsel's failure to meet further with
petitioner should not be presumed to be deficient or prejudicial.
H.

Failure to Conduct Adequate Voir Dire

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered
deficient performance by failing to conduct an adequate voir dire
from which an appellate court could determine whether a change of
venue should have been sought due to publicity about the murder
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(Br. of App. at 36). Counsel's alleged failure to make the
necessary record, petitioner argues, should release him from the
burden of establishing prejudice under the second prong of the
Strickland test (id.).

However, the record is sufficient to

establish that the publicity did not affect the impartiality of
the seated jurors and that counsel's failure to seek a change of
venue was not ineffective assistance.
Although an accused must be tried by a fair and
impartial jury, he is not entitled to be tried by a jury that has
heard nothing about his case.

State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797

(Utah 1991); State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1250 (Utah 1988),
habeas corpus granted on other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir.
1991).

The fact that most of the jurors had some exposure to the

case does not establish a due process violation.

Gardner, 789

P.2d at 277. The voir dire process need only establish the
impartiality of the jurors. Id., 789 P.2d at 277-78; State v.
James, 767 P.2d 549, 551 (Utah 1989).

This Court has not

mandated the questions to be asked in voir dire.

See James, 819

P.2d at 797; State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844 (Utah 1983).
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, sufficiently thorough
questioning of the venire occurred here.

The district court

questioned the venire individually in chambers, asking each
prospective juror what information he or she had received about
the case, the source of the information, and whether he or she
had formed an opinion about petitioner's sentence based on what
they had heard (Sent. Tr. IA & IB at 95-100, 117-20, 126-29, 16537

67, 207-09, 268-71, 290-95, 314-18, 348-50, 378-83, 412-14, 41821; a copy of the relevant voir dire of the seated jury is
submitted herewith as Addendum F).

Following the questioning,

the district court was satisfied with the jurors' impartiality.
Neither the record nor petitioner's argument to this Court
demonstrate any error in that determination.

Some of the seated

jurors had no media exposure at all (H.C. Tr. at 207-09, 412-14,
418-21), and the remaining jurors either had formed no opinion or
had formulated light impressions which they were willing to set
aside in order to listen to the evidence and apply the law (Sent,
Tr- IA & IB at 95-100, 117-20, 126-29, 165-67, 268-71, 290-95,
314-18, 348-50, 378-83; Addendum F).

This is sufficient to

establish the impartiality of the jury.
277-78; Laffertv, 749 P.2d at 1250-51.

Gardner, 789 P.2d at
Petitioner has failed to

explain what additional questions should have been asked and how
those questions would have caused a different result.

Hence, he

has not demonstrated how the original voir dire was insufficient.
I.

Failure to Further Object to the Special Verdict Forms
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to object to the use of the
special verdict forms on the grounds that they:

1) "misled" the

jury to impose the death penalty; 2) improperly allowed the jury
to consider as an aggravating circumstance an offense not
identified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1978); and 3) permitted
the jury to find three aggravating factors where only one was
available by law (Br. of App. at 38-41).
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He contends that this

conduct unfairly exposed him to a greater likelihood of receiving
the death penalty than otherwise permitted by law.
In petitioner's direct appeal, this Court rejected the
argument that the special verdict forms misled the jury toward
finding aggravating circumstances and imposing the death
sentence.

Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1280. Accordingly, any objection

by petitioner's trial counsel on the basis that the forms
encouraged the rendering of a death sentence would have had no
effect on the outcome of the proceedings, and his failure to make
the objection would not constitute ineffective assistance.
Colonna, 766 P.2d at 1067-68; Codiarma, 660 P.2d at 1109, 1113.
Petitioner asserts that the use as an aggravating
circumstance in the special verdict forms of the fact that he was
a parolee in possession of a firearm required an objection by his
trial counsel.

This circumstance does not appear in the listed

circumstances in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1978), which
pertained to determining petitioner's guilt in 1987 and 1988 (a
copy of the statute is submitted herewith as Addendum G ) .
However, petitioner had already pled guilty; only the penalty
phase remained.

Determination of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances for purposes of imposing an appropriate penalty is
not limited to the circumstances listed in the statute*
Sentencing for a capital felony in 1988 was governed by Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-207 (1978) (a copy of the statute is submitted
herewith as Addendum H).

The aggravating factors listed in § 76-

5-202 are expressly included in the aggravating circumstances for
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sentencing purposes,

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1978).

However,

aggravating circumstances for sentencing are not limited to the
factors listed in § 76-5-202.

The fact that petitioner was a

parolee in possession of a firearm constituted information about
his "character, background, [and] history" as permitted by § 763-207 for sentencing purposes.

It was properly included as an

aggravating factor in the sentencing phase, and counsel's failure
to object to the factor does not amount to deficient performance.
Petitioner also argues that counsel should have
objected to the special verdict forms because they listed two
statutory aggravating circumstances, i.e., in the course of a
robbery and committed for pecuniary gain, which enhanced the
likelihood of the death penalty because it divided a single act
into two aggravating circumstances.

However, the facts

demonstrate that each aggravating circumstance was a separate
act.

The evidence produced at the penalty hearing was that

petitioner killed Richard Ernest and took personal property
(Ernest's wallet, his car, and the personal effects and tools in
the car) from his person or immediate presence by using a
dangerous weapon.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978) (a copy of

the statute is submitted herewith as Addendum I).

Petitioner

later used Ernest's identity and credit cards to secure lodging
and to purchase items at a retail store.

The latter acts were a

pecuniary or personal gain separate from the robbery.

Hence, a

single act was not divided into two aggravating circumstances.
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Even if petitioner's argument were correct, the
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not a
numerical function.

The jury was instructed to consider the

totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, to
determine if the total aggravating outweighed the total
mitigating beyond a reasonable doubt, and that they must find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the death penalty was justified
and appropriate (5th R. at 265, Instruction No. 12; copy
submitted herewith as Addendum J).

The jury was specifically

instructed not to weigh the circumstances in terms of relative
numbers (Addendum J).

The jury can be presumed to have followed

the instructions and to have looked at the totality of the
circumstances in performing their weighing function.
Gardunio, 652 P. 2d 1342, 1344 (Utah 1982).

State v.

That homicide in the

course of a robbery and homicide committed for pecuniary gain
were given as separate circumstances does not mean that the jury
gave them improper weight.
Counsel's challenged performance was not prejudicial to
petitioner.

This Court, in the direct appeal, found that "the

[sentencing] court instructed the jury in meticulous compliance
with the standards set forth in State v. Wood and section 76-3207 and the special verdict questions and instructions did not
conflict with these standards[.]"

Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1280.

Because there was no prejudice from the giving of the
instructions and special verdict forms, there would be no
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prejudice stemming from counsel's failure to object thereto on
the grounds argued by petitioner.
J.

Cumulative Effect of Ineffectiveness Claims

Petitioner contends that while some of his claims of
ineffective assistance, taken separately, do not justify reversal
of his sentence, their cumulative effect establishes that his
counsel's ineffective representation (Br. of App. at 20).
The cumulative error doctrine applies only where
petitioner establishes the existence of reversible error.

Lairby

v. Barnes, 793 P.2d 377, 378 (Utah 1990); State v. Johnson, 784
P.2d 1135, 1146 (Utah 1989); Bundv, 763 P.2d at 806.

None of the

individual points raised by petitioner have been shown to be
ineffective assistance of counsel.

Each instance of trial

counsel's allegedly deficient performance consisted of counsel's
exercise of reasonable professional judgment or his omission of
objections or formal motions which would have had no effect on
the proceedings.

There is not a likelihood or even a significant

possibility that any of the alleged errors prejudiced
petitioner's right to a fair trial, and he has not shown that the
results of the sentencing proceedings were unreliable.
Accordingly, his request for relief based on cumulative error
should be denied.

Lairbv, 793 P.2d at 378.
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POINT III
PETITIONER IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED
TO REPRESENTATION AT STATE EXPENSE IN
PURSUING HABEAS RELIEF OR APPEALS THEREFROM
A,

Introduction and District Court's Ruling

Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare, as a
matter of state and federal constitutional law, that the State of
Utah must pay attorney's fees and costs for work done on an
inmate's behalf in connection with his initial state habeas
corpus proceedings and the first appeal therefrom (Br, of App. at
42).8

He equates the right to seek habeas review with the right

to take a direct appeal, claiming that once a state grants either
right, it must provide counsel to indigent inmates (Id. at 44-45).
Although voicing concern both for the inmate who must
rely on pro bono representation and for the lawyers "constrained"
to provide such services, the district court simultaneously
recognized the "superb" representation given petitioner in this
matter and the fact that the question is one for legislative, not
judicial, resolution (3d R. at 265, 280-81; Addendum D).

Because

petitioner has no constitutional right to counsel in a collateral

Habeas corpus proceedings necessarily involve challenges
which impact on a defendant's conviction and/or sentence.
Petitioner seeks payment "for the work done in the district court
and for the work done in connection with this appeal." (Br. of App.
at 42). This relief should not be granted by this Court as it
benefits petitioner's current counsel alone and does not impact on
petitioner's sentence or conviction.
If this Court finds a
constitutional right to counsel at state expense in this matter, it
should not grant the requested relief but should remand the case
for the appointment of counsel and a new evidentiary hearing,
ordering the state to pay costs and fees incurred on petitioner's
behalf in the new proceeding.
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review of his conviction, the State has no obligation to pay
attorney's fees for his counsel's representation of him in either
the initial habeas proceedings or this appeal therefrom.
B.
1.

Federal Constitution

Waiver
Petitioner waived federal constitutional review by

conceding the issue in the district court.

The State submitted a

memorandum to the district court in support of its motion for
partial summary judgment, using federal law to argue that
petitioner has no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings (3d R. at 46-47; copy submitted herewith
as Addendum K).

In response, petitioner argued that the State's

position must fail because
"it relies upon the U.S. Supreme Court decision that
states are not required to appoint counsel for indigent
death row inmates seeking state post conviction relief.
That determination is, of course, made under the
federal Constitution [sic]. As explained above in
great detail, the Utah Constitution takes an entirely
different approach to a writ of habeas corpus."
(3d R. at 92; copy submitted herewith as Addendum L).

The

remainder of petitioner's response focused solely on the state
constitution (3d R. at 92-94; Addendum L).

Six days later,

petitioner filed a more specific statement of his habeas claims
(3d R. at 113-21; copy submitted herewith as Addendum M ) .

That

statement expressly ties his claim for costs and attorney's fees
to the state constitution, ignoring completely the federal
constitution (3d R. at 120; Addendum M).
abandoned his federal claim.
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Hence, petitioner has

2.

Merits
Generally, the State would rely on its waiver argument

and ask this Court to procedurally bar petitioner's argument in
this appeal.

However, given this Court's position of broadly

addressing all issues in direct appeals involving capital cases,
the State includes a brief argument on the applicable case law
should this Court reach the merits of petitioner's argument.
Petitioner recognizes in his opening brief the
existence of United States Supreme Court case law which is
directly contrary to the position he takes on this issue before
this Court (Br. of App. at 45).

He then summarily states that

the cases "are distinguishable from the circumstances here[,]"
and "reserves argument for an appropriate response in a reply
brief should the state elect to rely upon these cases." (Id.).
He provides no legal analysis and makes no attempt to distinguish
the cases.

This ploy requires the State to make petitioner's

argument for him before it can show that the argument has no
merit.

The State has no responsibility to make petitioner's

argument, and petitioner should not be allowed to distinguish the
cases in his reply brief, to which the State cannot respond.
Petitioner cites two United States Supreme Court cases
in support of his assertion that he has a federal right to
counsel at state expense in state habeas proceedings wherein he
raises a new issue for the first time: Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600, 94 S. Ct. 2437 (1974), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.

45

353, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963).9

Although both cases provide that an

indigent inmate has a constitutional right to appointed counsel
in his first appeal of right, neither case expands its holding to
discretionary appeals in state courts as petitioner urges.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 610, 612, 616 (neither the due process
clause nor the equal protection clause of the federal
constitution requires that states provide indigents with counsel
to pursue state-granted discretionary appeals in state courts);
Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356 (expressly limiting its holding to cases
where an indigent inmate is denied appointed counsel in his first
appeal of right).

Accordingly, both cases are inapposite to

petitioner's claim.
The cases recognized without discussion by petitioner
as contrary to his position are determinative of this issue.

In

Pennsylvania v. Finlev, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987), the
Supreme Court reiterated and applied its holding in Moffitt that
the federal constitutional right of indigent prisoners to
appointed counsel which exists in a direct appeal does not exist
in state postconviction proceedings.

Id.., 481 U.S. at 555, 557

(Moffitt's holding and rationale "apply with even more force to
postconviction review.").

The Supreme Court reaffirmed its

position in both Finlev and Moffitt in Murray v. Giarratano, 492
U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (concluding that this rule "should
apply no differently in capital cases than in noncapital

9

He makes no assertion for relief based on the due process
clause of the federal constitution.
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cases."), cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 83 (1990).

These decisions

require rejection of petitioner's position.
C.

State Constitution

Petitioner seeks to expand his state constitutional
rights because he is an indigent capital defendant raising a new
issue for the first time in postconviction proceedings (Br. of
App. at 48).10

Utah courts have not expanded the right to

appointed counsel beyond the first appeal of right, and
petitioner cites no other jurisdiction which has interpreted its
own state constitution in the manner he now advocates.
Petitioner begins his argument by urging that the right
to appointed counsel which attaches to the state-granted right to
a direct appeal applies equally to the state-granted right to
habeas review (Br. of App. at 46-47).

He provides no legal

support or policy for this parallel.

The privilege of habeas

review in Utah's constitution comes from its federal counterpart,
10

As the district court correctly found, the question of state
payment of costs and attorney's fees incurred by indigent inmates
in postconviction proceedings is a legislative function, and the
legislature has not provided for the relief sought by petitioner.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (1990) (the duties of counsel assigned to
represent indigent defendants includes "the taking of a first
appeal of right and the prosecuting of other remedies before or
after a conviction, considered by the defending counsel to be in
the interest of justice except for other and subsequent
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings.M)
(emphasis added); Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-3(2) (1990) ("assigned
counsel shall not have the duty or power under this section to
represent an indigent defendant in any discretionary appeal or
action for a discretionary writ, other than in a meaningful first
appeal of right . . • • M ) ; see also Turtle Management, Inc. v.
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982) (Utah
"adheres to the well-established rule that attorney's fees
generally cannot be recovered unless provided for by statute or
contract."). Petitioner presents no statutory argument.
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U.S. Const., art. I, § 9 , and the inclusion of habeas review in
the state constitution separate and apart from the right to a
direct appeal suggests that the privileges are not to be granted
identical treatment.
(direct appeal).

Utah Const, art. 1, § 5 (habeas), § 12

While a direct appeal seeks to insure against

errors which occurred at the trial level and which are apparent
in the record, see, e.g., State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309
(Utah 1985) (requiring an adequate record before alleged errors
may be reviewed on the merits), postconviction review
historically arises from the common-law writ of error coram nobis
and provides the method by which a district court may look into
facts which do not appear on the face of the record but which
establish that the prisoner has been deprived of his right to a
fair trial.

State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981).

These differences support the federal position that direct and
collateral review do not carry identical constitutional
requirements, dictating against identical treatment thereof.
Petitioner provides no authority or analysis for the
distinction of capital and noncapital postconviction proceedings,
arguing only that an indigent capital inmate has no reasonable
access to habeas review absent appointment of counsel at state
expense.

Death row inmates have the same reasonable access to

state habeas review as any other incarcerated noncapital indigent
defendant.

The fact that Utah courts grant capital cases a more

expansive scope of review on direct appeal, State v. Menzies, 182
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah Mar. 11, 1992), does not dictate that
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capital cases require application of heightened review in habeas
proceedings.

See Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 8-10 (finding that the

special safeguards accompanying the guilt and penalty phases at
the trial level and the first direct appeal provide the degree of
reliability required to impose the death penalty, and making no
distinction in federal habeas proceedings between the rights of
capital and noncapital case petitioners, both of whom must meet
the same standards in establishing error).

Petitioner provides

no basis for this Court to depart from the federal rationale.
The severity of petitioner's sentence does not justify an
expansion of his state constitutional rights in postconviction
proceedings beyond those afforded other indigent inmates.

See

Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812, 815 (Utah) (in an appeal from the
dismissal of a habeas petition, this Court held that "[t]he
severity of the death penalty standing alone does not render it
unconscionable for this Court to deny further review."), cert,
denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980).

This is especially true where, as

here, petitioner not only obtained habeas review, but benefitted
from "superb" representation by pro bono counsel.
Petitioner urges that he is entitled to counsel because
his habeas petition includes a "new" claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.

However, raising a new issue in

postconviction proceedings which requires the taking of evidence
has not been held to convert a collateral proceeding to a direct
appeal, as defendant seems to argue.
501 U.S.

See Coleman v. Thompson,

, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640, 673 (1991) (even

where the challenge may only be presented in state postconviction
proceedings, there is no federal constitutional right to counsel
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in the collateral proceedings).

Postconviction proceedings, by

definition, do not involve issues which could or should have been
raised on direct appeal.
(Utah 1989).

Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547f 549

Therefore, every issue properly raised in habeas

proceedings will be raised for the first time, and the district
court is in a position to entertain evidentiary hearings to take
any additional evidence necessary to fully review the claims.
Petitioner may raise his ineffectiveness claim for the first time
in his habeas petition due to Utah's exception to its procedural
bar rules.

He does not explain why this entitles him to expanded

constitutional rights.
Finally, petitioner contends that his due process
rights were violated because he was denied a thorough
investigation into his ineffectiveness claims solely due to his
indigency.

The mere expense of an investigation is not a

sufficient policy reason to require payment of costs and fees by
the state as a constitutional right.

Petitioner's claim that the

proper investigation would require "large sums of money" and his
assertion that the necessary evidence to support his claims
exists are too speculative to establish a due process violation
or to support an expansion of his constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the denial of petitioner's
habeas petition should be affirmed.
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